Recently, barrier certificates have been introduced to prove the safety of continuous or hybrid dynamical systems. A barrier certificate needs to exhibit some barrier function, which partitions the state space in two subsets: the safe subset in which the state can be proved to remain and the complementary subset containing some unsafe region. This approach does not require any reachability analysis, but needs the computation of a valid barrier function, which is difficult when considering general nonlinear systems and barriers. This paper presents a new approach for the construction of barrier functions for nonlinear dynamical systems. The proposed technique searches for the parameters of a parametric barrier function using interval analysis. Complex dynamics can be considered without needing any relaxation of the constraints to be satisfied by the barrier function.
Introduction
Formal verification aims at proving that a certain behavior or property is fulfilled by a system. Verifying, e.g., the safety property for a system consists in ensuring that it will never reach a dangerous or an unwanted configuration. Safety verification is usually translated into a reachability analysis problem [4, 9, 11, 29, 30] . Starting from an initial region, a system must not reach some unsafe region. Different methods have been considered to address this problem. One may explicitly compute the reachable region and determine whether the system reaches the unsafe region [16] . An alternative idea is to compute an invariant for the system, i.e., a region in which the system is guaranteed to stay [9] . This paper considers a class of invariants determined by barrier functions.
A barrier function [23, 24] partitions the state space and isolates an unsafe region from the part of the state space containing the initial region. In [24] polynomial barriers are considered for polynomial systems and semi-definite programming is used to find satisfying barrier functions. Our aim is to extend the class of considered problems to non-polynomial systems and to non-polynomial barriers. This paper focuses on continuous-time systems.
The design of a barrier function is formulated as a quantified constraints satisfaction problem (QCSP) [6, 25] . Interval analysis is then used to find the parameters of a barrier function such that the QCSP is satisfied. More specifically, the algorithm presented in [18] for robust controller design is adapted and supplemented with some of the pruning schemes found in [7] to solve the QCSP associated to the barrier function design.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some related work. Section 3 defines the notion of barrier functions and formulates the design of barrier functions as a QCSP. Section 4 presents the framework developed to solve the QCSP. Design examples are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the work.
In what follows small italic letters x represent real variables while real vectors x are in bold. Intervals [x] and in-terval vectors (boxes) [x] are represented between brackets. We denote by IR the set of closed intervals over R, the set of real numbers. Data structures or sets S are in upper-case calligraphic. The derivative of a function x with respect to time t is denoted byẋ.
Related work
To prove the safety of a dynamical system, different approaches have been proposed [4, 9, 11, 15, 19, 30, 31] . One way is to explicitly compute an outer approximation of the reachable region from the initial region, i.e., the set of possible values for the initial state. If it does not intersect the unsafe region, then the system is safe. In [4, 14, 30 ] the reachable region is computed for linear hybrid systems for a finite time horizon using geometric representation such as polyhedra. The reachable region for non-linear systems is computed in [28] using an abstraction of the non-linear systems by a linear system expressed in a new system of coordinates. The reachability of a non-linear system is formulated as an optimization problem in [10] . In [8] , the Picard-Lindelöf operator is combined with Taylor models to find the reachable region for non-linear hybrid systems. The main downside of the reachability approach is the introduction of over-approximations during the computations which may lead to difficulties to decide whether the system is safe.
An alternative way to address the safety problem is by exhibiting an invariant region in which the system remains. If the invariant does not intersect the unsafe region then the safety of the system is proved. One way to find such an invariant is by using stability properties of the considered dynamical system [13] and to search for a Lyapunov function. In [22] a sum of squares decomposition and a semi-definite programming approach are employed to find a Lyapunov function for a system with polynomial dynamics. A template approach is considered in [27] to find Lyapunov functions using a branch and relax scheme and linear programming to solve the induced constraints. A more general idea about invariants is introduced in [24] . Instead of looking for a function that fulfills some stability conditions, a function is searched that separates the initial region from the unsafe region. This idea is extended in [16] to search for invariants in conjunctive normal form for hybrid systems.
Formulation
This section recalls the safety characterization introduced in [24] for continuous-time systems using barrier functions.
Safety for continuous-time systems
Consider the autonomous continuous-time perturbed dynamical systemẋ
where x ∈ X ⊆ R n is the state vector and d ∈ D is a constant and bounded disturbance. The set of possible initial states at t = 0 is denoted X 0 ⊂ X . There is some unsafe subset X u ⊆ X that shall not be reached by the system, whatever x 0 ∈ X 0 at time t = 0 and whatever d ∈ D. We assume that classical hypotheses (see, e.g., [5] ) on f are satisfied so that (1) has a unique solution x(t, x 0 , d) ∈ X for any given initial value x 0 ∈ X 0 at time t = 0 and any d ∈ D.
Barrier certificates
A way to prove that (1) is safe is by the barrier certificate approach introduced in [24] . A barrier is a differentiable function B : X → R that partitions the state space X into X − where B(x) 0 and X + where B(x) > 0 such that X 0 ⊆ X − and X u ⊆ X + . Moreover, B has to be such that ∀x 0 ∈ X 0 , ∀d ∈ D, ∀t 0, B(x(t, x 0 , d)) 0.
Proving that B(x(t, x 0 , d)) 0 requires an evaluation of the solution of (1) for all x 0 ∈ X 0 and d ∈ D. Alternatively, [24] provides some sufficient conditions a barrier function has to satisfy to prove the safety of a dynamical system, see Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Consider the dynamical system (1) and the sets X , D, X 0 and X u . If there exists a function B :
∀x ∈ X , ∀d ∈ D,
then (1) is safe.
In (4) ., . stands for the dot product in R n . In Theorem 1, (2) and (3) ensure that X 0 ⊆ X − , and X u ⊆ X + , while (4) states that if x is on the border between X − and X + (i.e., B(x) = 0), then the dynamics f pushes the state back in X − whatever the value of the disturbance d.
Parametric barrier functions
The search for a barrier B is challenging since it is over a functional space. As in [24] , this paper considers barriers belonging to a family of parametric functions (or templates) B(x, p) depending on a parameter vector p ∈ P ⊆ R m . Then one may search for some parameter value p such that B(x, p) satisfies (2)-(4).
If there is no p ∈ P such that B(x, p) satisfies (2)-(4), this does not mean that the system is not safe: other structures of functions B(x, p) could provide a barrier certificate.
Characterization using interval analysis
This section presents an approach to find a barrier function that fulfills the constraints of Theorem 1. These constraints are first reformulated to cast the design of a barrier function as a quantified constraint satisfaction problem (QCSP) [25] .
Constraint satisfaction problem
Assume that there exist some functions g 0 : X → R and g u : X → R, such that
and
Theorem 1 may be reformulated as follows.
holds true, then the dynamical system (1) is safe.
PROOF. The first component of ξ (x, p, d),
may be rewritten as
see, e.g., [12] . If ξ 0 (x, p) holds true for some p ∈ P and x ∈ X , then one has either x ∈ X 0 and B(x, p) 0, or x / ∈ X 0 . In both cases, (2) is satisfied. A similar derivation can be made for the second component of
Now, one may rewrite the last component of t (x, p, d),
which corresponds to (4). If ∃p ∈ P such that ∀x ∈ X , ∀d ∈ D, ξ (x, p, d) holds true, then the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied and (1) is safe. ✷
In [24] , (9) is relaxed into
with the consequence of possible elimination of barrier functions that would satisfy (9) for some p but not (14) . Our aim in this paper is to design barrier functions without resorting to this relaxation by considering methods from interval analysis [17] which allow to consider strongly nonlinear dynamics and barrier functions.
Solving the constraints
To find a valid barrier function one needs to find some p ∈ P such that B(x, p) satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2. For that purpose, the Computable Sufficient Conditions-Feasible Point Searcher (CSC-FPS) algorithm [18] is adapted.
In what follows, we assume that X , D, and P are boxes,
. CSC-FPS may also be applied when X , D, and P consist of a union of nonoverlapping boxes.
Consider some function g :
and to provide some satisfying p. We extend CSC-FPS to handle conjunctions and disjunctions of constraints and supplement it with efficient pruning techniques involving contractors provided by interval analysis [17] . In Proposition 2, ξ (x, p, d) consists of the conjunction of three terms of the form
. (16) For ξ 0 (x, p), defined in (7),
for ξ u (x, p), defined in (8),
for
To illustrate the main ideas of CSC-FPS combined with contractors, one focuses on the generic QCSP
(20) Finding a solution for such QCSP involves three steps: validation, reduction of the parameter and state spaces, and bisection.
Validation
In the validation step, one tries to prove that some vector
For that purpose, one chooses some arbitrary p ∈ [p] and evaluates the set of values
are easily obtained using inclusion functions provided by interval analysis.
The natural inclusion function is the simplest to obtain: all occurrences of the real variables are replaced by their interval counterpart and all arithmetic operations are evaluated using interval arithmetic. More sophisticated inclusion functions such as the centered form, or the Taylor inclusion function may also be used, see [17] .
Using inclusion functions, one may evaluate whether 
where A = R\A and B = R\B. One may easily verify (7) and (8) For (9) the inclusion is impossible to prove except in degenerate cases since A = {0}.
Contractors
Consider some function g : R n → R k and some set Z ⊂ R k .
Definition 4 A contractor C c : IR n → IR n associated to the generic constraint
is a function taking a box [x] as input and returning a box
C c provides a box containing the solutions of g(x) ∈ Z included in [x]: (25) ensures that the returned box is included in [x] and (26) ensures that no solution of g(x) ∈ Z in [x] is lost.
Consider
or by composition of contractors
A contractor C c1∨c2 for the disjunction c 1 ∨ c 2 of c 1 and c 2 may be obtained as follows
see [7] , with ✷{·} the interval hull of a set.
Using a contractor C c for (24), one is able to characterize
Proposition 5 Consider a box [x], the elementary constraint (24) , and the contracted box
where
, which is not necessarily a box.
) and assume that g(x) ∈ Z. Since g(x) ∈ Z and x ∈ [x], one should have 
and a contractor C τ for this constraint. It involves elementary contractors for the components of the disjunction in (31), combined as in (29 
[p] ( ′ , see Figure 1 
and there is no p ∈ [p] such that (31) holds true for all x ∈ [x], see Figure 1 
and there is no p ∈ One can reduce the size of the sets for the state x and the disturbance d on which (31) has to be verified using the contraction on the negation of this constraint. Consider the negation τ of τ
and a contractor C τ for this constraint. Assume that after applying C τ for the boxes [x], [p], and [d], one gets
From Proposition 5, one knows that
, one can focus on the search for some 
Bisection
One is unable to decide whether some p ∈ [p] satisfies (21) when (21) or (23) and when all bisected boxes are smaller than ε x , CSC returns unknown.
FPS performs similar bisections on [p]
and stops when the width of all bisected boxes are smaller than ε p > 0.
Composition of constraints
To prove the safety of the dynamical system (1), Proposition 2 shows that one has to find some
consists of the conjunction of three elementary constraints of the form (20) , validation requires the verification of (21) for the same p considering (7), (8) , and (9) simultaneousl y. Invalidation may be performed as soon as one is able to prove that one of the constraints (7), (8) , or (9) does not hold true using (23) . Contraction may benefit from the conjunction or disjunction of these constraints, as introduced in (28) and (29).
CSC-FPS algorithms with contractors
The CSC-FPS algorithm, presented in [18] is supplemented with the contractors introduced in Section 4.2 to improve its efficiency.
FPS, described in Algorithm 1, searches for some sat- ′ 0 is too small, even if one was not able to decide whether it constains a satisfying p, it is not further considered to ensure termination of FPS in finite time. The price to be paid in such situations is the impossibility to conclude that the initial box [p] does not contain some satisfying p. This is done by setting the flag to false at Line 1. Finally, when Q = ∅, no satisying p has been found. Whether [p] may however contain some satisfying p depends on the value of flag.
⊲ ξ0, ξu, ξ b from (7), (8) and (9) 2: queue
flag := true 4:
while Q = ∅ do 5:
[p] 0 := dequeue(Q) ⊲ Reduction of the parameter space using (28), (32), (33) 6: [p]
end if 10: 
, by an evaluation of τ . This is done at Line 12 using the result of a contractor, as described in (34) 
. This is indicated by setting flag to unknown at Line 17.
flag:=true 4:
continue ⊲ Validation using (21) 8:
return(false) ⊲ Reduction of the parameter space using (23) 11:
end if 12:
(
return(false) ⊲ Consequence of (34), (35) 15:
flag:=unknown 18:
⊲ Reduction of the state space using (37), (38) and bisection 20:
end if 24:
end while 25:
return(flag) 26: end procedure
Examples
This section presents experiments for the characterization of barrier functions. The considered dynamical systems are described first before providing numerical results, comparison of different approaches and discussions.
Dynamical system descriptions
For the following examples, one provides the dynamics of the system, the constraints g 0 and g u for the definition of the sets X 0 and X u , the state space [x] , and the parametric expression of the barrier function. In all cases, the parameter space is chosen as [p] = [−10, 10] m where m is the number of parameters.
Example 1 Consider the system ẋ 1
Example 2 Consider the system from [2] ẋ 1 Example 3 Consider the system from [21] ẋ 1
Example 4 Consider the disturbed system from [24] ẋ 1 
Example 5 Consider the system with a limit cycle 
Experimental conditions and results
CSC-FPS, presented in Section 4, has been implemented using the IBEX library [3, 7] . The selection of candidate barrier functions is performed choosing polynomials with increasing degree, except for Examples 1, 2, and 4, where parametric functions taken from [1, 2] are considered.
For each example, the computing time to get a valid barrier function and the number of bisections of the search box [p] are provided. Table 1 summarizes the results for the versions of CSC-FPS with and without contractors. As in [18] , we choose ε x = 10 −1 and ε p = 10 −5 . Computations were done on an Intel core 1.7 GHz processor with 8 GB of RAM. If after 30 minutes of computations no valid barrier function has been found, the search is stopped. This is denoted by T.O. (time out) in Table 1 . Moreover, for Examples 1, 4, and 5, graphical representation of the computed barrier functions are provided. In Figures 3, 4 , and 5, X 0 is in green, X u is in red, the bold line is the barrier function and some trajectories starting from X 0 are also represented.
The results in Table 1 show the importance of contractors which are beneficial in all cases. Thanks to contractors, valid barrier functions were obtained for all examples, which is not the case employing the original version of CSC-FPS proposed in [18] . In theory, both FPS and CSC are of exponential complexity in the dimension m of the parameter space and n of the state space. In practice, contractors allow, on the considered examples, to break this complexity and to consider high-dimensional
Alternative techniques based on RSolver may be significantly more efficient for some specific classes of problems where the parameters appear linearly in the parametric barrier functions. A combination of RSolver and our approach may be useful to improve the global efficiency of barrier function caracterization.
Future work will be dedicated to the search for the class of parametric barrier functions to consider. This may be done by exploring a library of candidate barrier functions. In our approach rejection of a candidate function occurs mainly after a timeout. Even if contractors aiming at eliminating some parts of the parameter space were defined, their efficiency is limited. Better contractors for that purpose may be very helpful.
An other future research direction is to extend the proposed method to hybrid systems as done in [24] , i.e., to consider a set of quantified constraints for each location of an hybrid automaton and the constraints associated to the transitions.
